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CORPORATIONS-LIABILITIES-INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION AS GROUND
FOR DISREGARDING CORPORATE ENTITY-Defendant Resnick, meeting minimum statutory incorporation requirements, organized a corporation and
thereafter persuaded defendants Cowan to join him in operating a used
car enterprise under the corporate name. No stock was issued, nor capital
paid in,1 although a checking account was opened for use by the business.
Car purchases were financed through loans made or guaranteed by the
elder Cowan, who held title until resale. Proceeds from resale transactions
were deposited in the checking account, from which defendant Resnick
reimbursed Cowan for money advanced. Sales volume averaged from $100,000 to $150,000 monthly. Assured that the elder Cowan was "backing" the
corporation, plaintiff sold cars to defendants following the described procedure. Corporate checks drawn by Resnick for the balance due on eight
cars were dishonored, and when the corporation filed in bankruptcy, plaintiff sued defendants on a theory of individual liability. The trial court held
for plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed, one justice dissenting. Capital investment was totally inadequate for the volume of business conducted, and
this factor, together with the failure to issue stock, is under the circumstances sufficient ground for disregarding the corporate entity. Automotriz
Del Golfo de California v. Resnick, (Cal. 1957) 306 P. (2d) I.
Judicial readiness to ignore the protective corporate veil when failure
to do so would sanction fraud or promote injustice2 is today widely evident.8 More sketchy, however, is support for the principal court's specific
reliance upon inadequate capitalization as the basis for permitting suit
against corporate personnel stripped of their normal liability limitation
privilege.4 While this particular approach has been used frequently when

1 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §1900 requires that every stock corporation
have a stated capital, ,but §25154 permits the directors to organize and transact business
prior to issuing shares.
2 E.g., In re Hedgeside Distillery Corp., (N.D. Cal. 1952) 123 F. Supp. 933; Watson
v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 61, 63 P. (2d) 295 (1936).
a Cases are collected in 1 Fl.ETCHER, Cvc. CoRP. §41 (1931). For California decisions, see
Schifferman, "The Alter Ego," 32 CAL. B. J. 143 (1957). Following California precedent
initiated by Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. (2d) 839, 129 P. (2d) 390 (1942), the majority treated
the issue of whether defendants had abused the corporate form as a question of fact.
Thus the decision of the lower court was binding if supported 1by the record. While it
is clear that the fact-finding body should .be called upon to decide disputes as to past
occurrences, questions of policy, viz., whether the abuse justifies holding the directors
individually liable, should be determined as a matter of law. See note by Professor Ballantine, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity as a Regulatory •Process," 31 CALIF. L. R.Ev.
426 (1943).
4 The following decisions turned, in a substantial degree, upon inadequacy of
capitalization: Shafford v. Otto Sales Company, (Cal. 1957) 308 P. (2d) 428 (invested
capital of $50, loan of $25,000, sales of $250,000 in 6 months, corporate entity was disregarded); Arnold v. Phillips, (5th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 497, cert. den. 313 U.S. 583
(1941) (invested capital of $50,000, loaned capital of $75,000, later additional substantial
loans, first $75,000 loan treated as invested capital); Eastern Products Corp. v. Tenn.
Coal, Iron &: R. Co., 151 Tenn. 239, 269 S.W. 4 (1924) (invested capital of $800, executory
contract for $485,000, the court refused to enforce the contract in favor of the under-
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a parent corporation creates a dummy subsidiary in order to achieve "dou•
ble insulation" for parent shareholders and directors, 5 no more than a
handful of decisions are reported in which a court accepted inadequate
corporate financing as the ground for reaching the shareholders of a single
corporation.6 In arriving at their result, these few courts have often tempered a naked "inadequate capital" attack by considering, in addition to
low ratios of paid-in capital to debt obligations or to business volume, such
factors as the cause of the default or insolvency,7 capital normally required
for comparable businesses, 8 and knowledge by plaintiff of capital structure.9 That a greater number of jurisdictions have not established inadequate capitalization alone as a ground for unlimited entrepreneur liability
is perhaps explained by three considerations: (I) fear that hindsight would
play too dominant a role in determining adequacy of capital; 10 (2) difficulties apparent in formulating a workable mathematical ratio of capital
to debt or to business volume; 11 and (3) feeling in some quarters that, in
view of the stated relationship of the legislature and the judiciary, compliance with minimum statutory capitalization standards should be decisive
in establishing limited liability.12 One court's reaction to this final objection
has been to require that actual fraud be shown before individual liability
is created, once the corporation attains de jure existence.13 A less rigid

capitalized corporation); Dixie Coal Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Williams, 221
Ala. 331, 128 S. 799 (1930) (the corporation operated without assets and was managed
as a proprietorship, held, legal fraud); Christian & Craft Grocery Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 S. 566 (1898) (corporation wholly without capital, defendant
told plaintiff the organization was a partnership, held, fraud); Taylor v. Newton, 117
Cal. App. (2d) 752, 257 P. (2d) 68 (1953) (individual transferred all his assets to a corporation, held, the corporation is the alter ego of the individual).
5 E.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., (4th Cir. 1920) 267 F. 676; Bartle
v. Home Owners Cooperative, 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E. (2d) 832 (1955). See LATIY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 194 (1936) for collected cases. It is questionable
whether the double insulation argument is valid. If the corporation in question was
organized with grossly inadequate capital it would seem to be immaterial whether another
corporation or an individual was held liable as the alter ego. 19 UNIV. Cm. ,L. R.Ev. 872
(1952). See Fuller, "The Incorporated Individual," 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373 at 1382 (1938),
in support, of the distinction.
6 Note 4 supra.
7 Taylor y. Newton, note 4 supra; Dixie Coal Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
Williams, note 4 supra.
s Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 197 P. (2d) 167 (1948).
9 Carlesimo v. Schwebel, note 8 supra, (contract and all correspondence written on
stationery with the corporate name as a heading); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371,
10 N.E. (2d) 259 (1937) (plaintiff, manager of the bankrupt hotel, was aware of the lack
of invested capital at the time he entered into the contract). On the basis of these two
cases, -both of which refused to disregard the corporate entity because of the knowledge
of the plaintiffs, the court in the principal case could have found that plaintiff assumed
the risk of undercapitalization by knowingly dealing with a corporation.
10 Opinion of the dissenting justice, principal case at 6.
11 LATIY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 136 (1936).
12Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919).
18lbid.
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balance of investor and creditor interests has been suggested, which
would allow such non-capital contributions as are normally available to,
similar corporations in similar circumstances.14 Ballantine would require
investment of that amount of capital needed to meet normally expected
debts.15 The majority opinion in the principal case, citing Ballantine at
length, ostensibly applies his test to the facts before it, and personal liability
was easily found since proved capital contribution was zero. It is interesting
to speculate whether the court might have been forced back to a fraud
finding to reach the same result, had even a small amount of paid-in
capital been shown, because little capital is ordinarily required in a buy-sell
used car operation. It would appear that if the primary purpose of
this area of our commercial law is to assure investor and creditor certainty, courts would do better to refuse to disregard the corporate entity,
abseQ.t individual fraud, if minimum statutory requirements have been
met. If, on the other hand, policy requires that an entrepreneur risk
capital commensurate with his possible economic gain, the more flexible
"similar corporation" or "reasonable need" tests should be applied, even
when the conditions of the statute have been strictly met. In any event, it
is clear that judges do not consider their hands tied by the mere de jure
existence of a corporation, if it was formed for fraudulent or purely insulative purposes. Although the tests for determination of individual liability may vary with the jurisdiction, they will almost certainly be framed
everywhere so as to provide the court some discretionary basis for reaching
behind the financially indefensible corporate structure.

Lewis L. Clum

H l.ATIY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 136 (1936). This author also
suggests a ratio of 1:1, contributed capital to loaned capital, as a possible practical
mathematical test.
15 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., 302 (1946). See also Cataldo, "Limited Liability
with One Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations," 18 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. P11.0B.
473 at 484 (1953) to the same effect.

